



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

had a scientific training in investigation, to give an impartial statement of the case for and against matriarchy? The book is obviously written for the unlearned reader who can not verify either Mrs. Gallichan's facts or conclusions, but if, though unlearned, he is intelligently cautious he will probably find himself wondering what an anti-feminist would make of the same facts.

In the second case, granted Mrs. Gallichan's conclusions are correct, have they any direct bearing on present-day problems? Surely no reasonable being denies that women organize and manage certain departments of human life excellently, but it is a far cry from a primitive state to modern Europe. Nor would many women have a revival of matriarchy if with it had to come that division of labor which according to this author was one of its essential causes.

NANCY CATTY.

London, England.

WHAT DO WE MEAN BY EDUCATION? By T. Welton, D.Lit., M.A. London: Macmillan & Co., 1915. Pp. xii, 256.

In this book Professor Welton discusses firstly the ultimate aim of education, and secondly the means by which the aim may be attained. Our aim in education must, he insists, depend upon our theory of life, and hence no complete agreement about it can be hoped for at present. The means must be dependent on the aim, being stated for the most part in the form of hypotheses. The element of truth in this argument does not however, we think, justify Professor Welton in separating the examination into the "aim" from that into the "means," still less in relegating all "inductive inquiries" into actual educative work and into child psychology to the latter investigation. Some of the most notable advances in modern educational science, to which Professor Welton himself has contributed, have been made by a systematic study of child nature with its instincts and impulses, and of the effects of educational practice, and these researches have in fact modified the aim which educators now feel able to set before them, as well as the means which they adopt to attain it. To attempt to decide fundamental educational principles without constant reference to this inductive knowledge is either to go back to the dogmatism of earlier writers and to risk falling into some of their absurdities, or to be content with generalities which win ready

acceptance because each teacher can put his own interpretation upon them. And indeed Professor Welton's statement of aim seems to us to belong to the latter class, though the syntheses of divergent theories by which he arrives at it are in themselves lucid and valuable.

Incidentally, Professor Welton's strictures on the work of experimental psychologists in connection with education seem hardly fair. Even the studies of fatigue, here criticised, have a negative value, whilst the investigations into different types of memory have obvious practical uses. Indeed it is difficult to understand the remark that "the power of retention," as such, is valueless. No doubt other types of memory are preferable, but no one who lacks the mechanical ability to retain easily things read or heard will ever underrate it, and its presence or absence in children is certainly important to those who regulate their work. Although educational science cannot attain the exactitude of the physical sciences, yet scientific and mathematical methods are applicable to it, as they are for instance to economics, and to criticise their use on the ground that the "average" child is "a mere symbol" suggests a misunderstanding of the whole meaning and application of statistics.

The aim of education being determined, Professor Welton discusses in a carefully reasoned chapter the true nature of freedom and the sense in which such freedom is possible or desirable in childhood, and what should be the relation of liberty to authority in education. But whether or no we agree with his conclusions we must regret his attack on the *Émile*, partly because Rousseau's revolt against "authority" served a useful purpose as a corrective, and still more because the exaggerations involved in it are so glaring that serious refutation seems waste of time, whilst the book as a whole has been and is a source of delight and inspiration. And Rousseau's worst mistake lies not in his vain attempt to avoid "authority," but in his assertion that children have neither emotions nor reasoning powers. A normally affectionate boy, brought up in close companionship, as Emile was, with a friendly tutor, might probably at the age of twelve, be so docile and devoted to the said tutor as to upset all Rousseau's calculations. Strangely enough Professor Welton himself seems to fall into a somewhat similar mistake in his analysis of child nature by ignoring the existence of the so-called "social" instincts. Hence he assumes that those educationalists who claim to rely chiefly on children's instincts and impulses—whose theory he calls in a

curious phrase "the extreme psychological view"—are regarding the child merely as an individual and encouraging him in "an absolute disregard of the feelings and wishes of others." But children show protective and unselfish impulses towards their younger brothers and sisters and towards animals just as they show impulses towards fear and curiosity, and these and other instinctive tendencies must be regarded as the germs of what Professor Welton calls the "higher spiritual life," which is consequently better described as a development of instinct than as "beyond" instinct.

The two remaining chapters, on the "Means" and the "Agents" of education, contain much suggestive exposition of current educational topics. Perhaps the most valuable sections are those on the connection between a boy's home interests and outlook, and the kind of subject which he is likely to appreciate in school. This point and the corresponding claim of the parent to a voice in what his child learns, deserve more attention than they have hitherto received, and Professor Welton's remarks should help to correct some too prevalent opinions such as that the half-time system persists entirely owing to parental short-sightedness and selfishness. There is an interesting discussion, too, on the different types of schools which are desirable and on their respective functions, and on the need for more and better-planned diversity. Finally we welcome the just appreciation of the position of those to whom definite teaching of dogmatic religion seems an essential part of all education: anyone who has discussed this subject with average "undenominationalists" will sympathise with Professor Welton's comment on their frequent inability to understand it.

CHRISTABEL MEREDITH.

Bangor, Ireland.

KANT'S CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT. Translated with Introduction and Notes by J. H. Bernard, D.D., B.C.L., Bishop of Ossory. Second edition, revised. London: Macmillan & Co. 1914. Pp. xlviii, 429.

Dr. Bernard, now Bishop of Ossory, is to be congratulated on the appearance of a second edition of his translation of Kant's *Critique of Judgement*. His translation, published over twenty-one years ago, was the pioneer English translation of the last of Kant's three *Critiques*, and it still remains the only one that